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What is Risk Aversion?
April 20, 2016
Abstract
According to the orthodox treatment of risk attitudes in decision theory, such attitudes are
explained in terms of the agents desires about concrete outcomes. The orthodoxy has been
criticised both for conating two types of attitudes and for committing agents to attitudes
that do not seem rationally required. To avoid these problems, it has been suggested that
we model risk attitudes in terms of a risk function that is independent of the agents utility
and probability functions. The main problem with that approach is that it suggests that
attitudes to risk are wholly distinct from peoples (non-instrumental) desires. To overcome
this problem, we develop a framework where an agents utility function is partly dened
over chance propositions (i.e., propositions describing objective probability distributions),
and argue that one should represent di¤erent risk attitudes in terms of di¤erent forms of
the utility function over such propositions.
1 Introduction
In colloquial talk, someone is said to be risk averse if they are disinclined to pursue actions
that have a non-negligible chance of resulting in a loss or whose benets are not guaranteed.
This disinclination can be spelled out in a number of di¤erent ways. Our focus will be on the
one that prevails in much of the literature in economics and decision theory, namely that to
be risk averse is to prefer any action A to another with the same expected benet but with
greater variance (canonically called a mean-preserving spreadof A). More precisely, let G be
any real-valued class of good (e.g. money) and consider lotteries that yield quantities g of G
with di¤erent probabilities. Then an agent is said to be risk averse with respect to G just in
case she prefers g for sure to a (non-trivial) lottery with expectation g. For instance, someone
who is risk averse with respect to money will disprefer a gamble yielding either $0 or $100 with
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equal probability to getting $50 for sure.
In the orthodox treatment of risk attitudes that prevails in both economics and decision
theory, this idea is typically formalised using the expected utility (EU) framework of John von
Neumann and Oskar Morgenstern (1944) (hereafter vN-M), though a similar treatment can be
given in other frameworks. Within this framework someone who is risk averse with respect to
money, say, must, in virtue of the way in which utility is cardinalised, have a concave utility
function for money, i.e., must assign diminishing marginal utility to quantities of money. So
the orthodoxy explanations risk aversion with respect to some good G in terms of a particular
property of the agents desires about quantities of G, as captured by the shape of her utility
function over G.
This treatment of risk attitudes has been challenged on two di¤erent, if related, grounds.
First, it has been extensively criticised for failing to distinguish desire attitudes to goods from
attitudes to risk itself. Many people feel that because of this failure, the orthodoxy just does
not capture the phenomenology of risk attitudes (see e.g. Watkins 1977 and Hansson 1988). For
instance, some insist that they evaluate small amounts of money linearly for example, that
the value they attach to $50 is precisely halfway between those they attach to $0 and $100 but
nevertheless strictly prefer $50 to a 50/50 gamble between $100 and $0. If this is so, then risk
attitudes with respect to a good are not determined by attitudes to quantities of that good the
way vN-M suggest. Second, there is a now a large body of empirical evidence suggesting that
people exhibit attitudes to risk that cannot be explained within this framework but which are
not obviously irrational; most famously in the paradoxes of Allais (1953) and Ellsberg (1961).
In response to these problems with the orthodox treatment of risk, there has been a recent
trend towards introducing a special function a risk function that, in addition to a probabil-
ity and a utility function, is used to represent attitudes to risky prospects: most notably in
cumulative prospect theory (see Tversky and Wakker 1995 and Wakker 2010) and the rank-
dependent utility theory that it draws on (e.g. Quiggin 1982), and in the recent risk-weighted
expected utility theory (Buchak 2013). Since these theories account for risk attitudes in terms
of the form of the risk function, they can accommodate the intuition that even people who
value money linearly might display risk averse behaviour. Moreover, these theories are more
permissive than the orthodoxy as to what counts as rational, and thus allow for many of the
intuitively rational preferences that the orthodox theory deems irrational. The introduction of
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a risk function to account for risk attitudes however raises the question of whether risk atti-
tudes really are a special type of attitude, wholly distinct from non-instrumental desires, as
these theories suggest. We shall argue that they are not.
The approach of this paper will di¤er from this recent trend. We show that it is possible
to cardinalise utility without making any assumptions about risk preferences, by extending of
Richard Je¤reys (1965) decision theory to domains containing chance propositions; that is,
propositions about objective probability distributions over outcomes of one kind or another.
This allows us to model intrinsic attitudes to risks in terms of the form of the agents desir-
ability function for chances of goods thereby respecting the intuition that risk attitudes are a
special kind of desire and to show how such attitudes co-determine, with the agents attitudes
to the goods themselves, her preferences for risky prospects. In addition to better capturing
the phenomenology of risk attitudes than either orthodox expected utility theory or its con-
temporary rivals, our framework di¤ers from these theories in providing a unied explanation
of the empirical evidence regarding risk attitudes and so-called ambiguity attitudes.
2 Risk Attitudes in the vN-M Framework
In the vN-M theory, the utilities of outcomes are determined by the lotteries that the agent
is willing to accept. Given lotteries with A and C as their possible outcomes (or prizes), for
instance, we can nd the outcomesrelative utilities by guring out what chance a lottery L
must confer on A for the agent to be indi¤erent between L and some third outcome B, lying
between A and C in the agents preference ranking. The basic idea is that your judgment
about B, relative to A on the one hand and C on the other, can be measured by the riskiness
of the lottery L involving A and C that you deem equally desirable as B. For instance, if you
are indi¤erent between L and B when the chance that L confers on A is 3=4, then B is three
quarters of the way up the utility scale that has C at the bottom and A at the top. This
information can be used to determine the expected utility of the lottery. If we, say, stipulate
that u(A) = 0 and u(C) = 1, then u(B) = u(L) = 3=4. This corresponds to the expected
utility of the lottery, since u(L) = 1=4  0 + 3=4  1 = 3=4.
It follows immediately from this way of constructing (cardinal) utilities that the agent must
have utilities for lotteries that are linear in the probabilities of the prizes. So if an agent strictly
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prefers $5 to a gamble that will either result in a prize of $0 or a prize $10, each prize having
a 0.5 chance, then we must, on the vN-M approach, account for this in terms of the agents
attitudes towards the monetary amounts in question, as represented by her utility function.
For, as we have seen, agents are assumed to evaluate lotteries by their expected utilities, so the
only value that we can adjust in order to account for this persons risk aversion is her utility
function over money (assuming that her evaluation of the probability of the prizes is in line
with the chances). In particular, we account for this attitude by postulating that money (in
the $0-$10 range) has decreasing marginal utility to the person (as represented by a concave
utility function over money in this range). It is this feature the assumption that utilities of
lotteries are linear in their probabilities that is at the centre of debate about the adequacy of
the orthodox theory.
2.1 Conceptual challenges
A long-standing complaint against the vN-M approach is that it mischaracterises attitudes to
risk. Such attitudes, the complaint goes, cannot be explained in terms of attitudes to concrete
outcomes. For it seems that two people might evaluate the possible outcomes of a bet in the
same way and agree about their probabilities, but nevertheless di¤er in whether they accept
the bet or not, since they have di¤erent views about what levels of risk are acceptable (Buchak
2013). Similarly, John Watkins (1977) insists that it is possible for individuals to evaluate
monetary outcomes linearly but nevertheless, due to their gambling temperament, turn down
bets with a positive monetary expectation. To return to the previous example, it seems a
conceptual possibility that a person who has a very strong dislike for gambling would turn
down the o¤er to trade B for the lottery L (which has A and C as possible prizes) except in
the special case when L is certain to result in A in which case L is just alternative A even
though she considers B much less desirable than A. In sum, it seems that peoples dislike for
gambling does not, by itself, tell us much about how they value the gamblesprizes.
The above type of criticism takes as its starting point agents who dislike risk and criticises
the vN-M approach for modelling their risk aversion in terms of their attitudes to concrete
outcomes. But since the vN-M approach equates decreasing marginal utility with risk aversion,
it can also be criticised for falsely implying that anyone with a concave utility function over
some good is risk averse with respect to that good. Bengt Hansson (1988) for instance tells the
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story of a professional gambler who turns down an o¤er to trade a single copy of a book that he
is fond o¤ for an even chance gamble between receiving no copy of the book and three copies.
Having been schooled in the vN-M approach, a decision analyst concludes that the gambler
must be risk averse. The gambler retorts that this is nonsense; being a professional gambler,
he has habituated himself to being risk neutral. The reason he turns down the gamble, he says,
is simply that the second and third copy is of almost no worth to him.1 Since one copy of the
book is of great value to him, the gamble he is being o¤ered has an equal chance of resulting
in a real loss (losing his single copy) and no real gain (getting two extra copies). And that is
the reason he turns down the bet. It is of course possible that someone else might display the
same preference between the single book and the gamble due to dislike of risk per se. But the
gambler turns down the gamble since quantities of the book have decreasing marginal worth
to him. These are psychologically distinct reasons that might give rise to the same pattern of
preference, and should thus be kept distinct in formal models of practical reasoning.
Decision theorists often respond in one of two ways when confronted with objections like
these. The rst is to question whether people really can say how they evaluate concrete out-
comes without consulting their preferences for risky prospects involving those outcomes; and,
correspondingly, whether people really can judge their own risk aversion with respect to some
good independently of their preferences between risky prospects involving those goods. But
this response does not mitigate the worry that the vN-M approach conates two distinct atti-
tudes. For we do not need to determine by introspection precisely the extent to which we desire
outcomes and are willing to accept risk, to be able to justify replies like the gamblers to the
decision analyst. Moreover, what Hanssons story illustrates is that, whether or not people can
make these judgements by introspection, the vN-M approach equivocates on two phenomena
that conceptually and psychologically are very di¤erent; on one hand, the decreasing marginal
worth of quantities of goods, on the other hand dislike for risk as such. In sum, whether or not
people are able to introspect precisely how they evaluate concrete outcomes or what risk they
are willing to accept, is orthogonal to the seemingly obvious point that these are two di¤erent
types of attitudes.
The second type of response that decision theorists and economists typically o¤er when
1To make the example particularly plausible, we can assume that the book is of great sentimental value to
the gambler but does not have much market value, or, more generally, that the gambler knows that he wont
get a price for the second and third copy that matches his evaluation of the rst copy.
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faced with criticism like that raised above, is to resort to a formalistic interpretation of expected
utility, according to which the role of expected utility theory is neither to explain nor to guide
rational action, but simply to mathematically represent rational preferences (or choices). If that
is the aim, then as long as we can represent, say, risk averse choice behaviour by postulating a
concave utility function, it does not matter that we are equivocating between two conceptually
distinct psychological attitudes. In other words, as long as, say, decreasing marginal utility is
behaviourally indistinct from what we might call purerisk aversion i.e., aversion to risk per
se it does not matter whether or not these are psychologically distinct, since the aim is simply
to represent the choice behaviour (see e.g. Harsanyi 1977).
The problem with this response is that we often do want to be able to explain, rather than
simply describe, behaviour in terms of the maximisation of a utility function. In other words,
we want to be able to say that a person chose an alternative because it was the alternative with
highest expected utility according to her. Moreover, when using decision theory to make policy
recommendations, as is commonly done or, more generally, when using the theory for decision-
making purposes we need to assume that the utilities on which we base the recommendation
exist prior to (and independently of) the choices that the theory recommends. Finally, if we
are trying to construct a formal theory of practical reasoning i.e., trying to characterise how
rational agents make choices rather than just mathematically representing choices they have
already made then our theory needs to distinguish the decreasing marginal utility of quantities
of goods from aversion to risk as such.
These objections to the orthodox treatment of risk will not get much traction without a
demonstration of how utility can be measured without presupposing the vN-M framework. In-
deed unless utility can be determined independently of assumptions about the nature of risk
attitudes the objections of Watkins and Hansson can be regarded as literally meaningless. But
there is a perfectly straightforward response to this worry: adopt one of the other frameworks
for cardinalising utility and test the claims of the vN-M theory within it. Various such frame-
works are already to be found in the decision-theoretic literature, including the aforementioned
cumulative prospect theory and risk-weighted expected utility. But, for reasons that we will
explain later on, we consider these frameworks to have their own problems, both conceptual
and empirical. So instead we will make use of Bayesian2 decision theory to cardinalise utility;
2We call a decision theory Bayesian if the probabilities that go into the expectation whose value rational
agents maximise are the agents own subjective probabilities. Thus Savages (1954) and Je¤reys (1965) decision
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Gains Losses
Low probability Risk Seeking Risk Aversion
High probability Risk Aversion Risk Seeking
Table 1: Fourfold Pattern of Risk Preferences
in particular an extended version of the variant developed by Richard Je¤rey (1965) that has
the virtue of not implying that the value of a lottery is linear in its probabilities.
2.2 Empirical challenges
The orthodox treatment of risk attitudes faces two distinct types of challenges from the grow-
ing body of evidence regarding peoples actual choices in situations of risk and uncertainty.3
Firstly, there is much evidence that people exhibit risk attitudes in their choices that cannot be
reconciled with expected utility theory and in particular that their preferences between risky
prospects are not linear in the chances of the outcomes. In Kahneman and Tverskys (1979)
famous study, for instance, they report the fourfold pattern of attitudes for simple lotteries of
the form x chance of $ydisplayed in Table 1, obtained by determining the agentsdollar prices
for these lotteries. The pattern of risk averse behaviour when it comes to lotteries with high
probability of monetary gains or low probability of losses, together with risk seeking behaviour
for lotteries with low probability of monetary gain or high probability of losses, cannot be rec-
onciled with vN-Ms expected utility theory no matter what utility function is attributed to
subjects. This has lead most decision theorists to conclude that expected utility theory is not
descriptively adequate as a theory of choice amongst risky prospects.
It is possible that the deviation from the predictions of the orthodox theory exhibited by
this pattern of choice is to be attributed to irrationality on the part of the deviating subjects.
And indeed the focus of interest in the decision-theoretic literature has been on the implications
of these results for descriptive decision theory, with little in the way of a consensus emerging
on their normative implications. But some instances of these risk preferences do not seem irra-
tional. The most famous example of this is the so-called Allais Paradox, originally introduced
by Maurice Allais (1953). The paradoxis generated by comparing peoples preferences over
two pairs of lotteries similar to those given in Table 2. The lotteries consist in tickets being
theories are Bayesian, but von Neumann and Morgenterns (1944) is not.
3We will follow the convention of calling decision situations where the relevant outcomes have known and
objective probabilities situations of risk, and we will call decision situations where the decision-maker lacks such
knowledge situations of uncertainty.
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randomly drawn, determining the prize of each lottery (for instance, lottery L1 results in a
prize of 5 million dollars if one of the tickets numbered 2-11 is drawn).
1 2  11 12  100
L1 $0 $5m $1m
L2 $1m $1m $1m
L3 $0 $5m $0
L4 $1m $1m $0
Table 2: Allaisparadox
In this situation, many people strictly prefer L2 over L1 but also L3 over L4, a pair of preferences
we will call the Allais preference. According to the orthodox theory, this pattern of preference
is irrational, since there is no way to assign utilities to the prizes on o¤er such that L2 gets a
higher expected utility than L1 and L3 gets a higher expected utility than L4. In other words,
the Allais preference cannot be represented as maximising expected utility (which according to
the orthodox picture implies that it is irrational).
Here is an explanation of why the reasoning underlying the Allais-preference is inconsistent
with EU theory. People with this preference nd that the value of decreasing the risk of $0
(from a base-line of $1m) from 0.01 to 0 exceeds the value of a 0.1 chance at $5m rather than
$1m. And that is why they prefer L2 to L1. However, the same marginal decrease in the risk
of $0 does not exceeds the value of a 0.1 chance at $5m rather than $1m when the decrease
is from 0.9 to 0.89. And that is why they prefer L4 to L3. (In other words, people typically
consider a reduction in the risk of winning nothing from very unlikely to impossible to be more
important than the same absolute decrease in risk from quite likely to only slightly less likely.)
But in both cases, people are comparing a 0.01 chance of getting $0 rather than $1m with a
0.1 chance of getting $5m rather than $1m. So what they are comparing on both occasions,
according to vN-Ms theory, is 0:01[u($1m)   u($0] with 0:1[u($5m)   u($1m)] (where u(x)
denotes the utility of x). So if this reduction in risk of ending up with $0 is worth foregoing a
0.1 chance at $5m when comparing L1 and L2, it should also, on the orthodox story, be worth
it when comparing L3 and L4.
The second type of empirical challenge that the orthodox EU theory is faced with relates
to choices that agents make in contexts characterised by both (subjective) uncertainty and
(objective) risk. In particular, the orthodoxy is unable to account for the phenomenon of
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ambiguity aversion, a pattern of preference that is typically exhibited in the famous Ellsberg
Paradox, but which can be much more simply explained with the following example.4
Suppose you have in front of you a coin, C1, that you know to be perfectly symmetric, and
that you know to have been tossed a great number of times and has come up heads exactly as
many times as it has come up tails. More generally, suppose that you possess the best possible
evidence for the coin being unbiased. Here are two questions: (1) How condent5 are you that
C1 will come up heads on its next toss? (2) How much would you be willing to pay for a bet
that pays you $10 if C1 lands heads on its next toss but pays nothing otherwise?
Now suppose instead that you have in front of you a coin, C2, that you know to be either
double headed or double tailed, but you dont know which. Here are again two analogous
questions: (1) How condent are you that C2 will come up heads on its next toss? (2) How
much would you be willing to pay for a bet that pays you $10 if C2 lands heads on its next toss
but pays nothing otherwise?
Most people seem to use something like the Principle of Insu¢ cient Reason when answering
questions like (1) (see e.g. Voorhoeve, et al., 2012). Since they have no more reason for thinking
that the coin will come up heads than tails, they are equally condent in these two possibilities.
But since these possibilities exhaust the possibility space, they should believe to degree 0.5
that the second coin comes up heads. But that is, of course, the same degree of belief as they
should have in the proposition that the rst coin comes up heads (assuming something like
Lewis1980 Principal Principle). There is, of course, an important di¤erence between their
judgements about the two coins, as we will discuss in more detail later on. In the rst case,
they are pretty certain that the coin has an (objective) chance of one-half of coming up heads
on the next toss; in the latter case they are not. But in both cases, they are equally condent
that the coin will come up heads on the next toss as that it will come up tails.
What about questions (2) and (2)? A number of experimental results on Ellsberg-type
decision problems show that people tend to be what is called ambiguity averse, meaning that
they prefer prospects with known chances of outcomes to ones with unknown chances (see e.g.
Wakker 2010). In the example under discussion, ambiguity aversion translates into a preference
4This version of the paradox assumes that we can enquire about peoples degrees of belief without consulting
their preferences between risky prospects. Those who adhere to the formalistic interpretation of Bayesian
expected utility theory and behaviourists more generally are unlikely to accept that assumption. So it is
worth noting that the original choice problem described by Ellsberg (1961) does not require that assumption.
5We will use condenceand degree of beliefinterchangeably.
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for a bet on C1 over a bet on C2 and hence a willingness to pay more for the rst bet than the
second.
Now the above answers may seem to create a problem for Bayesian decision theory. Since
the possible prizes are the same for the two bets, standard applications of the theory imply
that people should be willing to pay more for the rst bet than the second only if they are more
condent that they will get the prize (the $10) if they accept the rst bet than if they accept
the second bet. But they are not: they are condent to degree one-half of getting the $10 in
both cases. In response, orthodox Bayesians might try to argue that people who are willing
to pay more for the rst bet than the second have made some mistake in their instrumental
reasoning. But that seems implausible. Ambiguity aversion, even in these very simple set-ups,
is a robust phenomenon, making it unlikely that people are simply making a mistake.
In fact however the above analysis ignores the important di¤erence between the two cases.
In the rst case, a bet on heads amount to accepting a lottery which confers a chance of one-half
on the prize. In the second case a bet on heads is an action which yields the prize with chance
one or with chance zero depending on whether the coin is two-headed or two-tailed. But this
di¤erence between the two cases is irrelevant if the vN-M theory is correct. The upshot is
that ambiguity aversion, being a phenomenon that arises when both subjective and objective
uncertainty is present, raises a challenge to the combination of the Bayesian theory of rational
preference under uncertainty and the vN-M theory. Most of the literature on ambiguity aversion
is based on the assumption that the vN-M theory is correct and hence draws the conclusion that
ambiguity aversion is inconsistent with Bayesian rationality. We will take the contrary view,
arguing that ambiguity aversion is a permissible attitude to spreads of chances that is perfectly
consistent with the kind of Bayesian framework in which we will work, but inconsistent with
the vN-M theory.
Although the challenges presented by the empirical evidence concerning attitudes to risk
seem quite di¤erent from those presented by attitudes to ambiguity, we will see that the reason
why these two types of attitudes generate trouble for orthodox expected utility theory is much
same; namely, the theorys narrow conception of the (dis)value of risks and chances. As we show
in section 4, it is possible to account for both types of attitudes in a decision theory whose value
function is dened in part over a set of chance propositions. Moreover, this makes it possible
to represent an Allais-type preference and an ambiguity averse preference as maximising the
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value of the same desirability function, which means that we can o¤er a unied explanation of
the two (types of) empirical observations that have posed the greatest challenge to orthodox
decision theory. But rst, let us discuss a recent and quite inuential alternative to expected
utility theory, and explain why we think that this alternative does not do justice to ordinary
risk attitudes either.
3 Risk-Weighted Expected Utility Theory
Recently several authors have constructed non-expected utility theories that introduce a risk
function to represent peoples risk attitudes, with the aim, rst, to formally capture the intuition
that risk attitudes with respect to some good need not be determined by how people evaluate
quantities of that good; and, second, to make it possible to represent preferences like Allaisas
maximising agentsvalue functions. We will focus on Lara Buchaks (2013) recent risk-weighted
expected utility (REU) theory as a representative of these non-expected utility theories, but
our argument equally applies to (normative versions of) the theories on which Buchaks theory
is based (such as the rank-dependent utility theory). The simplest way to explain the risk-
weighted expected utility theory is by comparing it to classical (Bayesian) expected utility
theory. We do so in the next subsection, and raise two objections to REU theory in the
subsection after that.
3.1 REU versus EU
One of the main di¤erences between REU theory and more traditional Bayesian decision theory
concerns how many variables are determined by the agent we are trying to model, and, corre-
spondingly, how many functions we use to represent her mental attitudes. The orthodox theory
leaves it up to the agent to decide two things: rst, the values of the possible consequences of
the acts at the agents disposal, as represented by her utility function; second, the probabilities
of the di¤erent contingencies that determine which of these consequences are realised when
each act is performed, as represented by her subjective probability function. In addition, REU
theory leaves it up to the agents to decide how to aggregate the values of di¤erent possible out-
comes of an alternative in order to evaluate the overall value of the alternative, and represents
this by a risk function. The idea is that the form of an agents aggregation will depend on
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how she trades-o¤ chances for good outcomes against risks of bad outcomes. So whereas EU
theory models rational agents as maximising expected utility relative to a pair of utility and
probability functions, REU theory models rational agents as maximising risk-weighted expected
utility relative to a triple of utility, probability and risk functions.
To make the discussion that follows more precise, let r be a (non-decreasing) risk function,
satisfying the constraint that 0  r(p)  1 and r(0) = 0; r(1) = 1. The function is intuitively
to be understood as a weighing function on probabilities, whose purpose is to discount or
inate, in accordance with the agents attitudes to risk, the probability of attaining more than
the minimum that an alternative guarantees. Let si denote a state of the world, and f(si)
the outcome of act f when state si is actual. u is a utility function on outcomes and P a
probability function on states. Now the value of f , according to Buchak, is given by its risk
weighted expected utility, which, she argues, rational preferences maximise:
REU(f) =
X
i
u(f(si))  r(P (si)) (1)
Risk-weighted expected utility theory can allow for the possibility that two individuals with
the same beliefs and the same desires over risk-free outcomes di¤er in their evaluation of risky
prospects. Suppose both Anns and Bobs beliefs can be represented by the same probability
function and that they evaluate monetary outcomes in the same way. Nevertheless, Ann is
willing to pay up to and including $5 for an even chance gamble that either results in her
winning $10 or nothing, whereas Bob is only willing to pay $3 for the same gamble. As we
have seen, two people cannot di¤er in this way, according to orthodox EU theory: given the
di¤erence between Anns and Bobs attitudes to these gambles, they must either have di¤erent
beliefs or disagree about the relative values of the prizes on o¤er. In contrast, risk-weighted
expected utility theory can account for the above di¤erence between Ann and Bobs attitudes to
gambles, without postulating di¤erent probability or utility functions, by assuming that Anns
risk function is linear (r(p) = p) while Bobs is convex (in particular, r(0:5) < 0:5).
Risk-weighted expected utility theory can potentially account for the Allais preference in
a similar way. Given a linearity assumption which Buchak (2013: fn. 39) implicitly makes
but which we will not the Allais preference can be represented as maximising risk-weighted
expected utility whenever the risk function is convex, in particular, when the di¤erence between
12
r(1) and r(0:99) is greater than the di¤erence between r(0:11) and r(0:10). The intuitive
explanation for this, you may recall, is that a 0.01 probability di¤erence counts more heavily in
the agents decision-making when it means that a prize becomes certain as opposed to almost
certain, than when it means that a prize becomes only slightly more probable but still quite
unlikely.
3.2 Problems with REU theory
In this section we raise two problems for REU theory. The rst is that it cannot (nor is it
meant to) account for the Ellsberg preferences. Our simplied version of the Ellsberg paradox
su¢ ces to illustrate this. Recall that we are assuming that a person is equally condent that
C1 and C2 will come up heads on their next tosses; she is o¤ered a bet on each coin that pays
her $10 if it comes up heads on the next toss but nothing otherwise; and she is willing to pay
a higher price for the bet on the rst coin than the second, since only in the former case is she
condent that the coin is unbiased. The risk-weighted expected utility of both bets is equal to
r(0:5)  u($10)+ r(0:5)  u($0). Hence, REU theory cannot make sense of the willingness to pay
more for one of these bets than the other.6
The second problem with risk-weighted expected utility theory is that even in those cases
where it is consistent with risk averse preferences such as Allais, it mischaracterises the psy-
chology of risk attitudes. This is an especially grave problem for a theory like Buchaks, whose
benet compared to orthodox expected utility theory is partly meant to be that it better ts
the phenomenology of risk attitudes. The problem essentially consists in the fact that risk
attitudes are, according to REU theory, primitive mental attitudes, distinct from both desires
and beliefs. The risk function, r, is logically independent of both the probability function, P ,
and, more importantly for the present argument, also independent of the utility function, u.
This is not an accident. As Buchak (2013: 53-54) explains:
The utility function is supposed to represent desire ... and the probability function
is supposed to represent belief ... We try to make beliefs t the world,and we try
6Another problem with EU theory that REU theory cannot solve, unlike the theory developed in the next
section, is the Diamond (1967) paradox, which is based on EU theorys inability to account for the intuition
that sometimes it is valuable to give people a chance at a good even if they do not end up receiving the good.
See Stefánsson and Bradley (2015) for an explanation of how the framework discussed in the next section is
partly motivated by the problem raised by Diamond, and Stefánsson (2015: sec. 4) for a demonstration of REU
theorys inability to solve it.
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to make the world t our desires. But the risk function is neither of these things:
it does not quantify how we see the world it does not, for example, measure the
strength of an agents belief that things will go well or poorly for him and it
does not describe how we would like the world to be. It is not a belief about how
much risk one should tolerate, nor is it a desire for more or less risk. The risk
function corresponds neither to beliefs nor desires. Instead, it measures how an
agent structures the potential realizations of some of his aims.
We are happy to grant Buchak the claim that the attitudes that the risk function is meant
to represent are not beliefs. But we nd it hard to understand her view that these risk attitudes
are not a special kind of desire, especially if we accept her (quite standard) characterisation of
desire as the type of attitude to which we try to make the world t.7 Recall Bob, who values
money linearly but is nevertheless risk averse; for instance, prefers $5 for sure to a gamble whose
monetary expectation is $5. Surely, any risk function that reects this fact about Bob partly
describes how he would like the world to be. In particular, he would rather like the world to
be such that he holds $5 than a bet with the same monetary expectation, and his risk function
reects this wish. Moreover, Bob will, if instrumentally rational, try what he can to make the
world t this attitude, for instance by not accepting certain bets, and by hedging the risks he
exposed to. So risk attitudes are attitudes to which we try to t the world.
More generally, people who are risk averse have di¤erent views than the risk neutral (or risk
loving) about how outcomes should be distributed across the possibility space, as Buchak herself
points out (2013: 29). Informally put, risk averse people prefer goods (including chances) to be
spread evenly over the possibility space, such that they are guaranteed to get something that
is not too bad no matter what the world happens to be like. Risk loving individuals, on the
other hand, prefer goods to be more concentrated, such that if a state favourable to them turns
out to be actual, they get lots of the good in question. Again, these di¤erent attitudes will
manifest themselves in terms of di¤erent ways of trying to arrange the world; the risk averse
trying to arrange the world such that goods are evenly spread across the space of possibilities
(e.g. by hedging their bets), but the risk neutral trying to have them more concentrated (e.g.
by accepting risky bets).
Buchak emphasises in various places that she takes the risk function to represent how an
7Some of these arguments against Buchaks view can be found in Stefánsson (2014).
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individual structures the potential realizations of some of his aims (ibid.), which she takes
to be incompatible with seeing the risk function as representing part of an agents desires. But
it is unclear why these are incompatible interpretations. For it seems that the risk function
represents how an agent would want to (and will if she can) structure the realization of her
aims. Other things being equal, risk averse people will want to, and will try to, realise their
aims as safely as they can, even if that reduces the expected realisation of their aims. For
instance, they will, other things being equal, want to (and try to) structure the gambles they
hold in such a way to spread goods equally rather than unequally across the possibility space.
Doesnt this mean that they desire their gambles and other prospects to be structured in this
way rather than in a more risky way?
In sum, it seem to us that attitudes to risk are simply a special kind of desire, rather than
a primitive mental attitude on a par with beliefs and desires. But they are not desires about
concrete outcomes, as already discussed. So in that respect we agree with Buchaks criticism of
orthodox expected utility theory. Instead, they are desires about chance distributions. That is,
risk averse people want chances to be distributed one way, risk neutral and risk loving people
in other ways. In the next section we will make this suggestion more precise, by presenting a
decision theoretic framework where peoples value functions are partly dened over propositions
about chances. We will show how this framework, rst, respects the intuition that risk attitudes
are not about concrete outcomes but are still a special kind of desire, and, second, makes it
possible to represent both Ellsberg- and Allais-type preferences as maximising the expectation
of agentsvalue functions.
4 Risk Attitudes in the Je¤rey Framework
Our aim in this section is to present a framework in which preferences for risky prospects
can be cardinalised with only minimal assumptions about the properties of such preferences
and in particular without assuming that they are linear in chances. To do so we build on
Richard Je¤reys version of Bayesian decision theory. His theory has two great advantages in
this context, compared to the rival Bayesian theory of Leonard Savage (1954). First, since the
objects of desire in Je¤reys theory are propositions, it is considerably more natural to extend
the theory to allow for conative attitudes to chance distributions than to similarly extend
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Savages theory, where the objects of desire are interpreted as acts and formally modelled as
functions from the state space to the set of consequences. Second, Je¤reys theory depends on
much weaker assumptions than Savages, which enables us to evaluate proposals for constraints
on rational attitudes to risks and chances without taking too much for granted.
4.1 Linearity, Chance Neutrality and risk aversion
In Je¤reys theory the degrees of belief of a rational agent are measured by a subjective proba-
bility function, P , on a Boolean algebra of propositions, 
. Her degrees of desire, however, are
measured by a corresponding desirability function, V , dened on the same algebra but with
the logically contradictory proposition ? removed and satisfying for all A;B 2 
  f?g:
Desirability: If A ^B = ?, and P (A _B) 6= 0, then:
V (A _B) = V (A):P (A) + V (B):P (B)
P (A _B)
Necessary and su¢ cient conditions for preferences to be represented by such a pair of func-
tions, P and V , were established by Ethan Bolker (1966). None of these conditions have
anything special to say about preferences for risky prospects. Indeed there are no lotteries in
the basic Je¤rey-Bolker framework, so it is not possible to model risk preferences within it (let
alone cardinalise utility on the basis of them). This is a limitation that we now need to address.
We do so by explicitly introducing propositions about chances and then identifying lotteries
with conjunctions of such propositions.
Let Z be a Boolean subalgebra of the background Boolean algebra 
; intuitively Z contains
those propositions to which it is meaningful to ascribe chances.8 Let  = fchg be the set of
all probability functions on Z and let  = }() be the set of all subsets of . The elements
of  serve here as what we will call chance propositions. In particular, for any X 2 Z, and
x 2 [0; 1], let Ch(X) = x denote the chance proposition dened by fch 2  : ch(X) =
xg. Intuitively Ch(X) = x is the proposition that the chance of X is x (and the chance
of :X is 1   x). Let X = fX1; :::; Xng be an n-fold partition of Z, with the Xi being the
prospects that constitute the various possible prizesof a lottery or, more generally, outcomes
8Canonically we take the base propositions to be sets of possible worlds, but nothing hangs on this particular
treatment of them.
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of some stochastic process. Let
Tn
i=1(Ch(Xi) = xi) denote the conjunction of the n propositions
Ch(X1) = x1, Ch(X2) = x2, ..., and Ch(Xn) = xn, where the xi are such that
Pn
i=1 xi = 1. A
proposition
Tn
i=1(Ch(Xi) = xi) thus expresses the chances of realising each of the Xi, thereby
serving as the propositional equivalent, in this framework, of the lotteries that are the basic
objects of choice in the orthodox (vN-M) theory of decision-making under risk.
The focus of our interest is the product set   = Z  whose elements are combinations of
factual and chance prospects. Since   forms a Boolean algebra we can simply apply Bolkers
theorem to establish, for preferences over the propositions in     f?g satisfying the Bolker
axioms, the existence of a probability function P and desirability function V , respectively on
  and     f?g, measuring the agents degrees of belief in, and desire for, the propositions
contained in these sets; including, of course, propositions concerning chances. We thus have a
framework in which it is meaningful to ask what the relationship is between agentsattitudes
to concrete goods and their attitudes to chances of such goods, including lotteries over them.
And in particular whether or not agents preferences for lotteries must generally satisfy the
requirements of the vN-M theory or not.
We can give an immediate answer to the latter question. As we have seen, the vN-M theory
postulates that agentsutilities for lotteries are linear in the chances. This is captured in our
framework by the following condition on preferences for chance propositions:
Linearity: For any n-fold partition X of   and set fxig such that xi 2 [0; 1] and
Pn
i=1 xi = 1:
V (
n\
i=1
(Ch(Xi) = xi)) =
X
i
xi  V (Xi)
Linearity says that the desirability of any lottery is a sum of the desirabilities of the lotterys
prizes weighted by the chances accorded to them by the lottery. Informally, we can think of it
as capturing the idea that chances do not matter intrinsically to the agent; they matter only
instrumentally, as means to the attainment of the prizes that they are chances of. More exactly,
as shown in Stefánsson and Bradley (2015: Theorem 1), Linearity encodes the neutrality of
chances, the idea that one should not care about the chance of a (maximally specic) outcome
once one knows whether or not the outcome has been realised. Formally (and adopting the
convention that the status quo has desirability zero):
Chance Neutrality: V (Ch(X) = xjX) = 0
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So the question of whether or not an agents risk preferences within the extended framework
must conform with the vN-M theory boils down to that of whether it is rationally permissible
or not to attach any (dis)value to chances over and above the extent to which they make various
goods of which they are the chances of more or less likely. It seems to us that Chance Neutrality
makes a substantial value claim and is not a mere consistency condition on desire. Hence, on
the decision theoretic conception of rationality as consistency, people are rationally permitted
to like (and dislike) chances non-instrumentally.
We will not pursue this normative issue any further however as it has been argued at
length elsewhere that Linearity and Chance Neutrality are not requirements of rationality (see
Stefánsson and Bradley 2015). Instead let us return to the opening observation that dislike of
risk per se, rational or otherwise, is psychologically very di¤erent from the decreasing marginal
desirability of quantities of concrete goods, even though the two phenomena may give rise to
the same choice behaviour. Can we make sense of this observation within our framework? To
do so we must show how we can distinguish the two kinds of attitudes and then show how these
attitudes relate to risk aversion as characterised behaviourally by a preference for a lottery over
any mean-preserving spread of it. Lets consider each task in turn.
4.2 Distinguishing risk attitudes
Our central thesis is that an agents like or dislike of risk involving a good is captured by
the properties of her desirability function for chances of this good. Consider a lottery that
pays $100 with probability one-half and nothing otherwise and an agent whose desirabilities for
modest amounts of money are linear in quantities of it. If this agent attaches a desirability to
the half-chance of winning the $100 equal to the desirability she attaches to winning $50, then
we can say that she is neutral with regard to the risk of (not) winning the $100. But if the
desirability of the half-chance of winning the $100 is less than that of $50, then she must value
the half chance of $100 at less than half the value of the $100. So in this case the agent will
displays behavioural risk aversion (she will prefer the $50 to the lottery), not because of her
attitude to quantities of money (which were assumed to be linear), but because of her attitude
to the risk per se of (not) winning the $100. So unlike the vN-M theory, our framework can
distinguish between these two quite di¤erent motivations for the same choice behaviour.
In general, in our framework, an agents preferences amongst lotteries will depend not just on
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her desirability function for quantities of the good at stake, but also on her desirability function
for chances of these goods (indeed on the relationship between the two). To substantiate
this claim let us restrict attention to a class of simple lotteries identied by propositions of
the form The chance of $100 is xwhere, of course, x 2 [0; 1]. In Figure 1, we plot some
example desirability functions for these propositions against values for x (the chances). For
convenience, we set the desirability of a zero chance of $100 to zero and the desirability of $100
for sure to 1. If the vN-M theory is correct, then the relationship between chances of $100
and their desirability is linear and so the graph will be a straight line. On the other hand, if
the chances have diminishing marginal desirability then the graph will be concave. But there
are other possibilities: chances could have increasing marginal desirability, or a combination of
increasing and decreasing marginal desirability at di¤erent chances, as illustrated by the snake-
shaped curve plotted in Figure 1. Evidently, it is an empirical matter as to what attitudes to
chances agents actually display and there is no a priori reason why the graph should have one
shape rather than another (and no shape is imposed by the adoption of our framework).
Figure 1: Candidate Desirability Functions for Chances of $100
To see how these curves capture the agents attitudes to risk, let us dene a risk function R
on chances for an agent from her degrees of desire by setting R(x) equal to V ($y) where $y is
the amount of money such that the agent is indi¤erent between getting it with certainty and
getting $100 with chance x. So:
V (x; $100) = V ($y) = R(x)
Now the function R will behave much like the risk functions deployed in cumulative prospect
theory and risk-weighted EU theory since, given our choice of scaling of the desirability function,
V (x; $100) = R(x)  V ($100); i.e., the desirability of some chance of $100 will equal the risk-
weighted desirability of $100. (Nothing depends on this choice of scaling, but without it a
somewhat more complicated denition of R would be required.) So we can interpret the graphs
in Figure 1 as candidate risk curves, representing the agents attitude to risk as such, with the
linear one being the vN-M risk curve and the snake-shaped one being the curve postulated by
cumulative prospect theory. Crucially, however, the risk curves, so dened, are features of the
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agents desires and not some distinct attitude. More precisely, these risk curves are determined
by the relationship between the agents desires for concrete goods and her desires for the chances
of these goods. Hence, there is no reason to expect that properties of an agents attitudes to
the chances of one good, say money, will be the same as her attitudes to the chances of another,
say health. A professional gambler who bets only to maximise expected monetary value when
in the casino, may be extremely averse to taking risks with his health.
It is the way in which the attitudes that agents take to goods combine with the attitudes they
take to chances of goods that gives rise to behavioural risk aversion as initially dened, namely
as a preference for lotteries over mean preserving spreads of them. For instance, diminishing
marginal desirability of quantities of a good combined with constant marginal desirability of
chances of the good the only attitude to chances that the orthodox theory allows gives rise
to such risk averse behaviour. But so does constant marginal desirability of quantities of the
good combined with increasing marginal desirability of the chances. This case is illustrated
in Figure 2. Similarly, an agent may display risk neutrality in their choices (i.e., indi¤erence
between a lottery and any mean-preserving spread of it) because they assign increasing marginal
desirability to both quantities of the good and chances of it, or because they assign constant
marginal desirability to both, or because they assign decreasing marginal desirability to both!
Figure 2: Linear Desirability for Quantities of Money and Increasing Marginal Desirability for
Chances of $100
4.3 Ambiguity and the fourfold pattern
Let us now turn to explanation of the two empirical phenomena that standard expected utility
theory has such di¢ culty accommodating. The explanation we o¤er of an agents ambiguity
attitudes towards some good is very straightforward; they are simply the reection of the shape
of her desirability function for the chances of a good. In particular, ambiguity aversion with
respect to actions with consequences that are chances of monetary prizes reects the diminishing
marginal desirability of the chances of money. So on our account, ambiguity attitudes to goods
are simply attitudes to the chances of these goods.
Consider again the example of bets on the two di¤erent coins that we gave earlier. A bet
that the coin that is known to be fair will land heads has a sure consequence of a chance
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of one-half of winning $10. Hence, the desirability of this bet is equal to the desirability
of a half chance of winning $10. But the corresponding bet on the other coin has di¤erent
consequences in di¤erent states of the world: if the coin is two-tailed then the bet has no
chance of delivering the $10, but if it is two-headed then it is certain to result in a win of
$10. Its desirability, assuming that the agent assigns equal probability to both possibilities (as
revealed in an indi¤erence between betting on heads and betting on tails), is the average of
the desirability of no chance of winning $10 and the desirability of winning $10 for sure. Now
if these chances have diminishing marginal desirabilities, then, by denition, the di¤erence
between a half chance and a zero chance of winning is greater than that between certainty of
winning and a half chance of doing so. So then rationality requires that the agent prefer the
bet on the fair coin, i.e., that she displays ambiguity aversion.
The same explanation can be o¤ered of the pattern of preferences exhibited in the Ells-
berg paradox. Far from being inconsistent with Bayesian rationality, these preferences are, as
Bradley (2016) shows, required of Bayesian agents who attach diminishing marginal desirability
to chances of monetary outcomes. More generally, an agent with diminishing marginal desir-
abilities for the chances of some good will exhibit the kind of preference for hedging chances
that is characteristic of ambiguity aversion.
The explanation of the fourfold pattern of risk preferences (in particular, the Allais pref-
erence) reported by Kahneman and Tversky (1979) is equally straight-forward. These results
should be read as reporting the exchange rates between quantities of money and chances of
winning a xed amount of money induced by the agentsdegrees of desire for these two types of
good. So we can infer from them what sorts of relationships must hold between these desires.
For instance, they report for lotteries yielding $100 with di¤erent chances, the following median
cash equivalents: $14 for chance 0.05, $25 for chance 0.25, $36 for chance 0.5, $52 for chance
0.75, and $78 for chance 0.95. These exchange ratios reect the relationship between the agents
attitudes to monetary amounts in the range $0 to $100 and their attitudes to di¤erent chances
of $100. What cannot be determined from such data is what the shape of each desirability
function is. We can however conclude that the subjects value gains in chances of $100 more
highly than the corresponding expected gains in monetary amounts when both the absolute
chances and monetary amounts are small, but the other way around when both are large. So
agents will pay much larger sums of money for a gain in chances when these chances are small
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than when they are large.
One way in which these constraints could be satised is if agents have desirability functions
for money that are roughly linear in quantities and snake-shaped desirability functions for
chances, concave for small probabilities and convex for the very high ones. This is what is pre-
dicted by cumulative prospect theory. Such a postulate implies however that a Bayesian agent
will exhibit ambiguity seeking preferences in situations involving lotteries with high chances of
winning $100. The empirical evidence o¤ers little support for this implication; indeed it is not
consistent with the ambiguity averse patterns of preference frequently observed in the Ellsberg
paradox.
Figure 3: Desirability Function for Quantities of Money and Chances of $100
In contrast, the fourfold pattern of risk preferences is perfectly consistent with ambiguity
aversion in our framework. An agent will display both the fourfold pattern and ambiguity
aversion when the desirability function is concave over both quantities of money and chances,
but relatively less so over low chances of some amount than small percentages of the amount
and relatively more so over high chances of the amount than over large percentages of the
amount. To illustrate, suppose that agents have the desirability functions over monetary gains
and chances of $100 depicted in Figure 3. Note that although they have diminishing marginal
desirabilities for both, the shapes of the two functions are di¤erent, with the desirabilities of
chances initially rising more rapidly than those of the monetary amounts, but less rapidly later
on. Such agents would display precisely the risk seeking preferences at low chances and risk
aversion at high chances that Tversky and Kahneman report. For instance, they would be
willing to pay more than $1 to achieve a 0.01 chance at a $100 dollar prize when their chances
of the prize are 0, and would also be willing to pay more than $1 to avoid a 0.01 drop in the
chance of $100 when their chances are 1 (i.e., when the have already secured the prize). They
would also of course exhibit ambiguity aversion because of the concave shape of the desirability
function for chances.
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5 Conclusion
The orthodox treatment of risk attitudes in decision theory seems both conceptually and em-
pirically inadequate. Conceptually because it fails to distinguish attitudes to concrete goods
from attitudes to risks regarding these goods; empirically because it neither o¤ers a satisfactory
explanation of the fourfold pattern of risk behaviour observed in choice experiments, most fa-
mously in the Allais paradox, nor of ambiguity attitudes observed in setups such as the Ellsberg
paradox. We have o¤ered a framework in which it is both possible and natural to distinguish
attitudes to concrete goods from risk attitudes, and shown how these two types of attitudes
can combine to determine an agents choices in a way that is consistent with both the four-
fold pattern and with ambiguity aversion. In particular, an agent with diminishing marginal
desirabilities for chances of money will display ambiguity aversion in her choices in conditions in-
volving both subjective and objective uncertainty. Furthermore, if her desirabilities for chances
of money increase more rapidly than those of the corresponding monetary quantities at both
low chances and high chances, but less rapidly in between, then she will display the fourfold
pattern of risk preferences typically observed.
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